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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
UNAUTHORISED CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
JD Van der Vyver 
1 Introduction 
The law is not static but is subject to continuous change. This applies to international 
law as much as it does to the municipal law of any state. International law can be 
modified by treaties and conventions, and by the development of new rules of 
customary practice. In this contribution the development of international law through 
the medium of the unauthorised conduct of international institutions will receive 
special attention. 
It will be argued that provided the unauthorised conduct (a) is not expressly forbidden 
and (b) is acceptable to a cross-section of the international community of states, it 
can be the foundation of a new rule of customary international law. Two examples will 
suffice to prove the point, namely (a) the creation of ad hoc criminal tribunals by the 
Security Council of the United Nations, and (b) the military intervention of forces of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Serbia to put an end to the 
persecution of Kosovar Albanians by the repressive regime of Slobodan Milošević. 
2 Creation of ad hoc Criminal Tribunals by the Security Council of the 
United Nations 
Following atrocities that erupted during the early 1990's in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
the Security Council of the United Nations decided to deal with the situation in those 
countries by the creation of international criminal tribunals, namely (respectively) the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)1 and the International 
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1  As to the ICTY, see in general McGoldrick "Criminal Trials before International Tribunals22-36. 
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),2 in order to bring the perpetrators of those 
atrocities to justice. Those tribunals owed their existence to Security Council 
resolutions adopted under the Chapter VII powers of the Council to address situations 
that constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.3 
The Security Council probably acted ultra vires when it resorted to the creation of 
criminal tribunals pursuant to its Chapter VII powers.4 
The Security Council has been entrusted with the "primary responsibility" of 
maintaining international peace and security.5 It has been said that the establishment 
of ad hoc tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of genocide and persons who violated 
the rules of international humanitarian law does fall within the ambit of measures that 
can be adopted by the Security Council to satisfy the goal of restoring and maintaining 
international peace and security, notwithstanding the absence of any direct mention 
of such a competence in the (non-exhaustive) list of powers entrusted to the Security 
Council in Article 41 of the UN Charter,6 but the matter was not at all beyond dispute.7 
In Prosecutor v Duško Tadić the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY based the competence 
of the Security Council to establish an international criminal tribunal on three grounds:8 
$ The Security Council has been entrusted with wide, though not unfettered, 
powers, listed in Articles 39-42 of the UN Charter, to deal with a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. The list of powers is not 
exhaustive and is wide enough to include the establishment of an international 
                                        
2  As to the ICTR, see in general McGoldrich "Criminal Trials before International Tribunals" 36-40. 
3  SC Res 827 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); 
SC Res 955 (1994) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); and see Pejic 
1997 Alb L Rev 843-845; Ciampi "Other Forms of Cooperation" 1711. 
4  See Alvarez 1996 EJIL 245-60. 
5  Article 24(1) Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
6  See for example Ahlbrecht Geschichte der Völkerrechtlichen Strafgerichtbarkeit 243 (arguing that 
the creation of a judicial body whose functions are limited in terms of subject-matter and time 
does come within the ambit of "measures" not involving armed conflict within the meaning of a 41 
of the UN Charter); Morris 1998 AJIL 68. 
7  See for example Ahlbrecht Geschichte der Völkerrechtlichen Strafgerichtbarkeit 240-242; Arnold 
UNO-Sicherheitsrat 130-131; Crawford "Work of the International Law Commission" 25 note 10. 
8  Prosecutor v Duško Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeals 
on Jurisdiction) Case No IT-94-1-A (2 Oct 1995) paras 33-48; and see Rowe 1996 Int'l & Comp LQ 
691-695; Kreß 1996 EuGRZ 640-642. 




$ The Security Council is admittedly not a judicial body or entrusted with judicial 
powers; but since it did not delegate any of its functions to the ad hoc tribunal, 
that was of no consequence. What the Security Council did in fact was to 
establish a subsidiary organ, without a separate juristic personality, to execute 
its own function of maintaining international peace and security, and entrusting 
that body with judicial powers as an appropriate means of counteracting a 
threat to international peace and security fell squarely within its range of 
powers.10 
$ The rule that a court must be established by law as applied in a municipal 
setting does not apply in international law. The "most sensible and most likely" 
meaning of "established by law" in the international context is that the tribunal 
must be established in accordance with the rule of law: "it must provide all the 
guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conformity with 
internationally recognized human rights instruments."11 
The second point perhaps requires further clarification. In international law, legal 
subjectivity has been conferred on international organisations, of which the United 
Nations is one. Within the United Nations structure, a distinction must be made 
between organs of the Organisation and subsidiary organs entrusted with executing 
the functions of the organs of the United Nations. An organ of the United Nations 
derives its existence and functions from the UN Charter, and new organs of the 
                                        
9  Prosecutor v Duško Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeals 
on Jurisdiction) Case No IT-94-1-A (2 Oct 1995) paras 33-36. 
10  Prosecutor v Duško Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeals 
on Jurisdiction) Case No IT-94-1-A (2 Oct 1995) paras 37-38; and see Sarooshi 1996 BYIL 428-
431. In 1954, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered an advisory opinion on the question 
whether it was within the power of the General Assembly to establish the Administrative Tribunal 
of the United Nations with power to hear and to decide staff grievances, and in particular whether 
the General Assembly could entrust the Tribunal with the power to pronounce decisions which 
would be binding on the General Assembly itself. The ICJ stated, inter alia, that "[b]y establishing 
the Administrative Tribunal the General Assembly was not delegating the performance of its own 
functions: it was exercising a power which it had under the Charter to regulate staff relations. In 
regard to the Secretariat, the General Assembly is given by the Charter a power to make 
regulations, but not a power to adjudicate upon, or otherwise deal with, particular instances." 
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunals: Advisory 
Opinion 21 ILR 310 (13 July 1954) 321. 
11  Prosecutor v Duško Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction) Case No IT-
94-1-T (10 Aug 1995) para 45; and see Swart "Arrest and Surrender" 1669. 
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Organisation can be created only through an amendment of the UN Charter. Subsidiary 
organs, on the other hand, may be created by resolution of the organ whose functions 
they are called upon to execute. Such subsidiary organs include the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights. The ICTY and ICTR are in that sense merely subsidiary organs of 
the Security Council charged with powers that serve as a means of executing the 
primary function of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. 
The denotation of the ICTY and ICTR as subsidiary organs of the Security Council has 
been challenged by several analysts. It has been noted, for example, that the Security 
Council has not been given absolute authority over those ad hoc tribunals.12 Judges 
of the Court are appointed by the General Assembly (admittedly from a list submitted 
to it by the Security Council);13 and the Chief Prosecutor, though formally appointed 
by the Security Council, is nominated by the Secretary General of the United Nations.14 
The independence of the Prosecutor "as a separate organ of the International Tribunal 
…"15 may also speak against the subsidiary status of the tribunals. 
Proclaiming the ICTY and ICTR to be subsidiary organs of the Security Council in any 
event does not resolve the predicament of their creation. The question remains 
whether the UN Charter includes the creation of courts of law to prosecute individuals 
within the powers of the Security Council as a means of securing international peace 
and security.  
The following arguments may be advanced in support of the proposition that the 
Security Council, in creating ad hoc criminal tribunals, exceeded its authorised powers: 
 The powers entrusted to the Security Council for maintaining international 
peace and security are encapsulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the 
ones not involving the use of armed force (the Article 41 powers) include 
                                        
12  See Partsch "Sicherheitsrat als Gerichtsgründer" 13 col 1, 17 col 2. 
13  Article 13(2) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) (ICTY 
Statute); a 12(3) Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) (ICTR Statute). 
14  Article 16(4) ICTY Statute; and see a 15(3) ICTR Statute. 
15  Article 16(2) ICTY Statute; and see a 15(2) ICTR Statute. 
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"measures" such as "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and 
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations."16 Although these specific powers do 
not constitute a numerus clausus, the establishment of a criminal tribunal 
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be brought within the enclave of 
retributory responses enumerated in the Charter as required by the eiusdem 
generis rule of interpretation.17 
 Since one is here dealing with punitive measures, the relevant empowering 
provisions of the Charter must be subjected to restrictive interpretation. 
 And finally, the Security Council has been empowered to take action against 
States and not against individuals. 
The statement of the ICTY in the case of Duško Tadić that Security Council Resolutions 
731 and 748 requiring the Libyan government to surrender the two Libyan nationals 
suspected of the Lockerbie bombing and imposing economic sanctions against Libya 
as a means of securing compliance with that decision were "in substance, acting upon 
individuals, seeking the extradition and trial of those Libyan nationals" totally missed 
the point.18 Security Council Resolution 731 called upon Libya to surrender the 
suspects; and Security Council Resolution 748 imposed sanctions against Libya and 
not against the two suspects. 
Other instances often cited to demonstrate that the establishment of a judicial body 
by the Security Council was not without precedent19 include the following: in 1949 the 
General Assembly (not the Security Council) established the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal to resolve personnel disputes within the Organisation;20 in 
                                        
16  Article 41 UN Charter. 
17  Martha Minow refers with some skepticism to the creation of the ad hoc tribunals pursuant to "a 
generous interpretation of the United Nations' authority to respond to threats to international 
peace and security". Minow Between Vengeance and Forgiveness 35; and also see Wedgwood 
"Constitution and the ICC" 119 (noting that "the authority of the Security Council to create 
additional ad hoc institutions has been questioned by some member states of the United Nations"). 
18  See Prosecutor v Duško Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction) Case 
No IT-94-1-T (10 Aug 1995) para 36. 
19  See for example Arnold UNO-Sicherheitsrat 68-69, 71 (referring to GA Res 351 (1949), SC Res 687 
(1991) and SC Res 864 (1993)); Partsch "Sicherheitsrat als Gerichtsgründer" 12 col 1 (referring to 
SC Res 689 (1991)). 
20  GA Res 351A (IV). 
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1991 the Security Council created a Fund to pay compensation to governments, 
nationals and organisations who had suffered direct loss, damage - including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources - or injury in 
consequence of the unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, and 
established a Commission to administer the Fund;21 and in 1993 the Security Council 
imposed military sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA), the militant rebel group in Angola under Jonas Savimbi.22 These so-
called precedents are far removed from establishing a criminal court with jurisdiction 
over individuals. 
Alfred Rubin raised other concerns pertinent to the establishment of the ICTY, based 
not so much on matters of principle but on the contingencies prevailing in the former 
Yugoslavia. For example, Bosnia was not a state at the time, and since only states are 
under an obligation to comply with Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council 
there was no means, according to Rubin, for compelling the authorities of that region 
to comply with demands for the surrender of suspects to the Tribunal.23 These more 
practical, time- and place-oriented, problems need not be further explored for the 
purposes of the present survey, except perhaps for noting that a permanent 
international criminal tribunal can be constituted in a manner that would avoid such 
contingent discrepancies inherent in the constraints of Security Council control. 
The decision of the Security Council to establish a criminal tribunal clearly was "[t]he 
most far-reaching use of Art 41 ordering measures not listed …"24 One analyst 
described the pertinent interpretation of Article 41 by the Security Council as "dynamic 
and teleological".25 Another suggested that the creation of an international criminal 
tribunal by the Security Council may be seen as "a modern form of collective 
humanitarian intervention, to deal with … massive human rights violations …"26 The 
                                        
21  SC Res 687 (1991). 
22  SC Res 864 (1993). 
23  Rubin 1994 Pace Int'l L Rev 8-13. 
24  Frowein "Chapter VII Action" 626. 
25  Arnold UNO-Sicherheitsrat 70. 
26  Jones Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal 41. 
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ICTR recognised that the Security Council, by asserting jurisdiction over individuals, 
"provided an important innovation of international law".27 
That, indeed, is how international law evolves. The appropriate response of the 
Security Council to the circumstances that prevailed in the former Yugoslavia, and 
subsequently in Rwanda, was not within the contemplation of the drafters of the UN 
Charter way back in 1945. Everyone would also agree that armed intervention under 
Article 42 of the UN Charter ought to be avoided as far as possible, and in any event 
was in all likelihood not an appropriate and effective means of preserving or restoring 
peace and security in the Balkans. Attempting to establish an international criminal 
tribunal through the agency of the General Assembly of the United Nations or by 
means of a treaty arrangement would most likely have been an exercise in futility and 
would in any event have been too time-consuming.28 The Security Council cannot be 
expected to simply sit back and let the atrocities be, merely because the Charter does 
not make provision for measures that would be suitable for meeting the challenges of 
a new era. Provided the action taken by the Security Council (i) does not run counter 
to an express prohibition in the UN Charter, and (ii) meets with general approval by 
the international community of States - that is, the exercise of power by the Security 
Council is legitimate - then the "innovation of international law" acquires the attributes 
of legality - that is, a new rule of international law is created. That would not be the 
case if the assumption of powers by the Security Council, or any other law-creating 
agency of international law, were to provoke general condemnation by a cross-section 
of the countries of the world. 
In June 2007 the Security Council of the United Nations did create yet another ad hoc 
tribunal. It decided by 10 votes to 0 (with China, Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and South 
Africa abstaining) to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate and to 
                                        
27  Prosecutor v Kanyabashi (Jurisdiction) Case No ICTR-96-15-T (18 June 1997) para 35; Berman 
"Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council" 174-75 (noting 
that the competence of the Security Council to establish ad hoc tribunals "was no longer seriously 
under challenge"); Lamb 1999 BYIL 203 note 17 (referring to the establishment of the ad hoc 
Tribunals as "an unprecedented response" of the Security Council to a threat to international 
peace); Goldstone 2001 Wash U J L & Pol'y 120. 
28  See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993) UN Doc S/25704 (3 May 1993); (1993) 32 ILM 1159 para 20; and see Scharf Balkan Justice 
55. 
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try suspects of the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafik al-Hariri.29 
3 The Kosovo Airstrikes by NATO Forces 
In the wake of untold atrocities committed by government agencies of the former 
Yugoslavia against Kosovar Albanians as a means of "ethnic cleansing" of the region, 
forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) began a bombing campaign 
in Belgrade in which 13 of the 19 NATO countries participated. The hostilities lasted 
from 24 March to 9 June 1999. The NATO intervention was widely applauded but also 
sharply condemned. Central to the dispute was the legal basis for affording legality, 
or at least legitimacy, to the air strikes.30 
The North Atlantic Treaty is essentially a collective self-defense Pact.31 It was devised 
by the Member States to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity 
to resist armed attack",32 and to act when "the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened".33 Legitimation of the 
bombing campaign in Belgrade can, in a word, not be based on the North Atlantic 
Treaty as such. 
It strikes one as odd that proponents of the military campaign emphasized the goals 
to be achieved by the military action rather than its basis in international law. NATO's 
stated objectives were encapsulated in five points: 
 An end to the killing by Yugoslav army and police forces in Kosovo;  
 The withdrawal of those forces from the province;  
 The deployment of a NATO-led international force in Kosovo;  
 The return of all refugees; and  
                                        
29  SC Res 1757 (2007) Annex; and see De Wet 2008 Friedens-Warte 41 (note, though, that the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon is not a hybrid tribunal in the sense contemplated by this author). 
30  See the commendable collection of editorial comments on NATO's Kosovo Intervention published 
in 1999 AJIL 824-862. 
31  Article 5 North Atlantic Treaty (1949) ("The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all").  
32  Article 3 North Atlantic Treaty (1949). 
33  Article 4 North Atlantic Treaty (1949). 
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 A political settlement for Kosovo.34 
When announcing the air strikes against Serbian targets, President Bill Clinton of the 
United States proclaimed that the campaign had three objectives:  
First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its 
support for peace; second, to deter President Milošević from continuing and escalating 
his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks; and third, if 
necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by 
seriously diminishing its military capabilities.35 
It would seem that a feasible justification of the airstrikes would be based on 
humanitarian intervention. However, only two NATO countries (Belgium and Germany) 
based the legality of the campaign on humanitarian intervention. 
There is indeed wide support among publicists for holding that humanitarian 
intervention is the only basis upon which either the legality or the legitimacy of the air 
strikes could possibly be based.36 Condemnation of or support for the military action 
in Serbia therefore in the final analysis depended on the view preferred by individual 
analysts in regard to the ultimate question as to whether or not humanitarian 
intervention remained lawful under the current rules of international law; and if not, 
whether the resort to arms might or might not derive legitimacy from the humanitarian 
objectives it set out to promote. 
It is perhaps important to note that the Security Council did, after the event, sanction 
the implementation of the stated objectives of the Kosovo campaign,37 without 
denouncing the NATO military action and while endorsing the Interim Agreement for 
                                        
34  See Chinkin 1999 AJIL 841 note 2. 
35  Remarks Announcing Air Strikes against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) - Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents vol 35.12 513 (24 March 
1999) 514; and also see Address to the Nation on Airstrikes against Serbian Targets in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) - Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
vol 35.12 516 (24 March 1999) 517; Wedgwood 1999 AJIL 829. 
36  See Kemp Individual Criminal Liability 41; Bilder 1999 J Transnat'l L & Pol'y 153. Note, however, 
that Jordan Paust based the legality of the air strikes on (his interpretation of) a 52 of the UN 
Charter. Paust 2002 Cornell Int'l LJ 546-547. 
37  SC Res 1244 of 10 June 1999. 
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Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo of 7 June 1999 (the Rambouillet Accord).38 By 
approving the Kosovo settlement, argues Louis Henkin, the Security Council 
"effectively ratified the NATO action and gave it the Council's blessing".39 This, in turn, 
can be seen as an endorsement by the Security Council of humanitarian intervention 
in comparable circumstances. 
The NATO action and Security Council response, according to Professor Louis Henkin, 
may reflect a step toward a change in the law; part of "the quest for developing 'a 
form of collective intervention' beyond the veto-bound Security Council".40 It should 
be noted, though, that the legality of humanitarian intervention actually preceded the 
UN Charter; and if Kosovo is to be the guide, humanitarian intervention must be 
resorted to in response to only the most extreme cases of horrendous human right 
violations, and ought always to be executed by multi-national action. 
It is submitted that even though the North Atlantic Treaty, being essentially a collective 
self-defence Pact, did not authorise offensive action in cases where no NATO country 
had been attacked, the Member States of NATO have now established their right under 
the Treaty to embark on a humanitarian intervention campaign. Provided, again, that 
the action taken (i) does not run counter to an express prohibition in the Treaty, and 
(ii) meets with general approval by the international community of states - that is, the 
action taken is legitimate - then the "innovation of international law" acquires the 
attributes of legality - that is, a new rule of international law is created. That, indeed, 
is how international law evolves. The formation of a new norm of international law 
would not result if the action taken violated an express prohibition of international law 
and/or provoked general condemnation by a cross-section of the countries of the 
world. 
4 The ISIS crisis 
Let me also refer to a recent, quite radical innovation in international humanitarian 
law that was sparked by atrocities committed by a Sunni insurgent group engaged in 
                                        
38  Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo UN Doc S/1999/648 (7 June 1999). 
39  Henkin 1999 AJIL 826. 
40  Henkin 1999 AJIL 828. 
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violent acts of terror as a means of establishing an Islamic state in the Middle East. 
Efforts to engage in a military response to those atrocities have led to the development 
of international humanitarian law to accommodate an armed intervention under the 
rubric of what might be called the "unwilling or unable paradigm". 
The insurgent group originated in 1999 under the name of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-
Jihad as the forerunner of Tanzim Qaidat al-Jahid fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly 
known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. In 2006 it joined other Sunni insurgent groups to form the 
Mujahideen Shura Council, which consolidated into the Islamic State of Iraq, and with 
a significant presence in Al Anbar, Nineveh and Kirkut. In 2013 the group changed its 
name to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It grew significantly under the 
leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi due to what was perceived as discrimination 
against the Sunni faction of Islam. Until February 2014 ISIL had close ties with al 
Qaeda, but following a power struggle al Qaeda cut all ties with the group. On 29 June 
2014 the group was renamed as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
ISIS aspires to bring most traditionally Muslim-inhabited states under its political 
control, including Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus and Southern 
Turkey. It has acquired considerable financial resources by gaining control of oil fields 
in the eastern province of Deir-al-Zour, taking control of bank institutions and 
allocating to itself large sums of money, and receiving generous funding from wealthy 
donors in Sunni countries of the Persian Gulf. It has lured into its ranks thousands of 
foreign volunteers, including some from the United States and the United Kingdom. 
It strictly imposes Islamic punishments such as amputations, beheadings and 
crucifixions, and has become notorious on account of its performance of innumerable 
acts of extreme terror violence. The beheadings of American journalist James Foley, 
American/Israeli journalist Steven Sotloff, British humanitarian aid workers David 
Haines, American humanitarian aid worker Peter Kassig, British taxi driver and 
humanitarian aid worker Alan Henning, and Japanese journalist Kenji Goto, and the 
burning to death of a Jordanian pilot Moath al-Kasasbeh, were videotaped and 
displayed on the Internet for the world to see. On 15 February 2015 ISIS publicly 
displayed the beheading in Libya of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christian fishermen. On 29 
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March 2015 a video was released showing the beheading of eight men said to be 
Shiite Muslims. ISIS was also responsible for the destruction of valuable religious 
shrines and works of art that were of special significance to rival Islamic factions. 
A key question that has emerged in recent years is whether or not members of the 
states from abroad can within the confines of international humanitarian law embark 
on armed intervention against ISIL/ISIS strongholds in countries of the Middle East. 
The Security Council of the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
in August 2014 deplored and condemned "in the strongest terms the terrorist acts of 
ISIL and its violent extremist ideology, and its continuous gross, systematic and 
widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian 
law".41 In September 2014 the European Parliament in similar vein condemned "the 
atrocities threatened or committed by ISIS against various groups not sharing their 
convictions, above all religious and ethnic minorities such as Christians, Yezidi, Shabak 
and Turkmen, but also Shiites and Sunnis", and denounced "the odious assassination 
by ISIS of two American journalists and a British aid worker".42 ISIL/ISIS was 
proclaimed a terrorists organisation by the United States (on 17 December 2004), 
Australia (on 2 March 2006), Canada (on 20 August 2012), Turkey (on 30 October 
2013), Saudi Arabia (on 7 March 2014), the United Kingdom (on 20 June 2014), 
Indonesia (on 1 August 2014), the United Arab Emirates (on 20 August 2014), Israel 
(on 3 September 2014), Malaysia (on 24 September 2014), Egypt (on 30 November 
2014), India (on 16 December 2014), the Russian Federation (on 29 December 2014), 
Kyrgyzstan (on 25 March 2015), and Pakistan (on 29 August 2015).43 ISIS is 
furthermore banned in Germany (since September 2014) and Switzerland (since 
October 2014).44 The banning includes the prohibition of propaganda in favour of and 
financial support for ISIS. The terrorist acts of ISIS in Iraq were also condemned by 
                                        
41  SC Res 2170 (2014). 
42  European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Iraq and Syria and the ISIS Offensive Doc 
2014/2843 (RSP) para 1. 
43  Wikipedia 2015 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant# 
Designation_as_a_terrorist_organisation. 
44  Wikipedia 2015 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant# 
Designation_as_a_terrorist_organisation. 
JD VAN DER VYVER  PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1314 
Syria,45 while Jordan in February 2015 made its condemnation of the organisation 
known by launching airstrikes against ISIS targets.46 
Iraq has requested military support from the United Kingdom and the United States, 
among others, in its armed struggle against ISIS. On 26 September 2014 the British 
House of Commons adopted by 524 votes in favour and 43 votes against the following 
motion: 
That this House condemns the barbaric acts of ISIL against the peoples of Iraq 
including the Sunni, Shia, Kurds, Christians and Yazidi and the humanitarian crisis 
this is causing; recognizes the clear threat ISIL poses to the territorial integrity of 
Iraq and the request from the Government of Iraq for military support from the 
international community and the specific request to the UK Government for such 
support; further recognizes the threat ISIL poses to wider international security and 
the UK directly through its sponsorship of terrorist attacks and its murder of a British 
hostage; acknowledges the broad coalition contributing to military support of the 
Government of Iraq including countries throughout the Middle East; further 
acknowledges the request of the Government of Iraq for international support to 
defend itself against the threat ISIL poses to Iraq and its citizens and the clear legal 
basis that this provides for action in Iraq; notes that this motion does not endorse 
UK air strikes in Syria as part of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be 
subject to a separate vote in Parliament; accordingly supports Her Majesty's 
Government, working with allies, in supporting the Government of Iraq in protecting 
civilians and restoring its territorial integrity, including the use of UK air strikes to 
support Iraqi, including Kurdish, security forces' efforts against ISIL in Iraq; notes 
that Her Majesty's Government will not deploy UK troops in ground combat 
operations; and offers its wholehearted support to men and women of Her Majesty's 
armed forces.47 
On 30 March 2015 the Canadian House of Commons approved by majority vote a 
government proposal to extend the military campaign in Iraq for up to one year, and 
to authorise airstrikes in Syria. Confining British military support to operations in Iraq 
was based on the fact that Syria had not requested the United Kingdom (or Canada 
and the United States) to attack ISIS strongholds in that country. The United States, 
however, did launch air attack against al Qaeda targets in Syria. In doing so the Obama 
administration was confronted by two distinct problems: one within the confines of its 
constitutional law, and the other under the dictates of international humanitarian law. 
                                        
45  SANA 2014 http://www.sana.sy/en/?p=2988. 
46  AP and Network Writers 2015 http://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/jordan-continues-
their-revenge-on-isis-carrying-out-airstrikes-against-the-terror-group/news-
story/b0dce593af0f349afff96e737ae4afbe. 
47  British House of Commons Decision of 26 September 2014. 
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The constitutional problem amounted to the following dilemma. Even though the 
American Constitution requires Congressional approval before the nation goes to 
war,48 President Obama initially did not request the consent of Congress for the 
military interventions in Iraq and in Syria. He based the legality of the airstrikes 
essentially on the 2001 Authorisation of Military Force against Terrorists, which 
authorised the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those 
who he determined "planned, authorised, committed or aided" the September 11th 
attacks of 2001,49 and the 2002 Authorisation for Use of Military Force against Iraq, 
which authorised the President― 
… to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary 
and appropriate in order to― 
(1)  defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat 
posed by Iraq; and  
(2)  enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding 
Iraq.50 
It requires, to say the least, quite a stretch of the imagination to construe a link 
between the bombing campaign against ISIL/ISIS and the terrorist attack of 
September 11th or the invasion of Iraq by the George W Bush administration in 2002. 
However, the legality of the current bombing campaign under the municipal law of the 
United States is beyond the reach of this survey, except perhaps to mention that the 
Obama administration sought to justify its reliance on the congressional authorisations 
of the armed conflict in Afghanistan and in Iraq (a) by not confining its airstrikes to 
ISIS targets in Iraq but also targeting al Qaeda, and (b) by continuing to refer to ISIL 
(of which al Qaeda was a part) even though the organisation has changed its name 
to ISIS (of which al Qaeda is not a part). 
There might therefore after all be some merit in this madness. Since the Obama 
administration based the legality under municipal law of the airstrikes against ISIS 
targets on the 2002 authorisation by Congress of the War against Terror ignited by al 
                                        
48  Article 8(10) Constitution of the United States of America, 1787. 
49  Authorisation for Use of Military Force against Terrorists Public Law No 107-40, 115 STAT 224 (14 
September 2001). 
50  Authorisation for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002 Public Law No 107-243, 116 
STAT 1498, 50 USC (16 October 2002) s 3. 
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Qaeda on September 11th, and on the 2002 authorisation by Congress of the invasion 
of Iraq, and those armed attacks did not involve ISIS at all, current airstrikes against 
al Qaeda targets were in all likelihood intended to afford a degree of credence to 
relying on the 2001 and 2002 Congressional authorisations for the airstrikes of 2014 
against ISIS. Relying on the 2001 and 2002 congressional authorisations in any event 
remains farfetched. So why not simply obtain congressional authorisation for the 2014 
airstrikes targeting ISIS? The answer to this question is in all likelihood the fear that 
Congress might decline to authorise those airstrikes, (a) because many members of 
Congress would most likely consider airstrikes without the backing of American 
soldiers on the ground as futile, and/or (b) because there were clear indications that 
a vast number of Republicans would oppose any state action emanating from an 
Obama initiative merely in opposition to President Obama and irrespective of the 
merits of those initiatives. In his 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama 
did say he would seek congressional approval of the air strikes in Iraq and in Syria.51 
On 11 February 2015 the President submitted a request to Congress to authorise 
military force to "degrade and defeat" the ISIS forces in the Middle East without 
sustaining large-scale combat operation by US ground forces, which would "show the 
world we are united in our resolve to counter the threat" posed by ISIS.52 The matter 
has not yet come before Congress. 
Within the confines of international humanitarian law, the airstrikes in Iraq by 
American and other national armed forces are clearly lawful because they were 
approved, and indeed requested, by the Government of Iraq. The airstrikes in Syria 
are most likely not lawful under the existing laws and practices of international 
humanitarian law, because they were not invited by the government of Syria. The 
judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua v United States of 
America can be cited in support of these assessments.53 The Nicaragua Case of 1986 
                                        
51  Jaffe and Walsh 2015 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/05/politics/isis-war-authority-vote/. 
52  White House 2015 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf; and 
also see President of the USA 2015 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/11/letter_president_authorisation_use_united_states_armed_forces_islamic_state
_iraq_levant.pdf. 
53  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America): Merits 1986 ICJ 13 (27 June 1986). 
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is authority for the proposition that (a) a state can use military force against insurgents 
who take up arms against the government of that state; (b) the state may invite 
military support from other states to repress the insurgency; (c) it is unlawful for other 
states to afford military assistance to the insurgents.54 
The United States indeed informed Syria of its intended airstrikes and requested the 
Syrian government not to intervene - and Syria as a matter of fact did not intervene. 
Could this be interpreted as implied consent? Probably not! 
The Security Council in its Resolution of 15 August 2014 called on all States "to take 
all measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with their 
obligations under international law to counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated 
by extremism and intolerance perpetrated by individuals or entities associated with 
ISIL, ANF [Al Nusrah Front] and Al-Qaeda and to prevent the subversion of education, 
cultural and religious institutions by terrorists and their supporters".55 Although 
"measures as may be necessary and appropriate" could be taken to include armed 
force, it was generally understood that the resolution was not intended to authorise 
an armed intervention. The representative of the Russian Federation, who supported 
the Resolution, stated quite emphatically that "it should not be taken as approval of 
military action".56 The Syrian representative, who also supported the Resolution (the 
Resolution was adopted unanimously) called upon the Security Council "in the future, 
to consult with his country and others in the region in order to make its action against 
terrorism effective".57 The legality of airstrikes beyond the borders of Iraq can 
therefore not be based on Security Council authorisation under its Chapter VII powers. 
All of the above culminated in efforts to justify the airstrikes in Syria under the rubric 
of an original and entirely new justification of armed interventions designated by 
American proponents as the "unwilling or unable" paradigm. 
                                        
54  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America): Merits 1986 ICJ 13 (27 June 1986) paras 195, 196 (at 103). 
55  SC Res 2170 (2014) para 6. 
56  See UN 2014 http://www.un.org/press/en.2014/sc11520.doc.htm. 
57  United Nations: Meeting Coverage and Press Releases "Statement by Bashar Ja'afari (Syria)" 
http://www.un.org/press/en.2014/sc11520.doc.htm. 
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In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 23 September 2014, 
Ambassador Samantha Power, representative of the United States of America to the 
United Nations, justified the airstrikes in Syria along the following lines: 
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many 
other countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and 
beyond. States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent 
right to self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the case 
here, the government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable 
to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks. The Syrian regime has shown that 
it cannot and will not confront these safe-havens effectively itself.58 
Earlier, the unwilling or unable rationale was also endorsed by John Brennan, Assistant 
to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, in remarks addressed 
to the Program on Law and Security of Harvard Law School in 2011. He emphasised 
that while the United States will uphold legal principles of state sovereignty and the 
laws of war, it "reserve[s] the right to take unilateral action if or when other 
governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves".59 
Attorney-General Eric Holder, speaking at Northwestern University School of Law in 
2012, had this to say: 
[T]here are instances where our government has a clear authority - and, I would 
argue, the responsibility - to defend the United States through the appropriate and 
lawful use of lethal force....This does not mean that we can use military force 
whenever and wherever we want. International legal principles, including respect for 
another nation's sovereignty, constrain our ability to act unilaterally. But the use of 
force in foreign territory would be consistent with these international legal principles 
if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved - or after a 
determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat 
to the United States.60 
5 Concluding observations 
It is perhaps ironical that the development of international law in instances exemplified 
in this essay stemmed from the need to cope with acts of barbarism that continue to 
                                        
58  Power 2014 http://www.vox.com/2014/9/23/6836195/read-us-letter-to-un-security-council-
claiming-self-defense-justifies. 
59  Brennan 2011 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-
strengthening-our-security-by-adhering-to-our-values-and-laws; and see Brooks 2013 Am U Int'l L 
Rev 727. 
60  US DOJ 2012 http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-
northwestern-university-school-of-law; and see Brooks 2013 Am U Int'l L Rev 727. 
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prevail in the world today and which include newly designed strategies of violence that 
were not foreseen when the existing norms of good governance were designed and 
proclaimed. This has been a matter of great concern to the international community 
of states. Creating ad hoc tribunals to bring perpetrators of genocide and crimes 
against humanity to justice, and for a collective self-defence organisation to exceed 
its mandate in order to counteract serious repression by a government against its own 
people, must therefore be applauded. 
The unwilling or unable rationale as a means of combatting acts of international 
terrorism is perhaps rooted in international efforts to prevent the escalation of violence 
in our troubled times. In a Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty of December 2001 on The Responsibility to Protect, it is 
proclaimed that the international responsibility to protect supersedes the principle of 
non-intervention in the affairs of other states in instances where those other states 
are either unwilling or unable to restrain serious harm emanating from within their 
national borders. The Report proclaimed in summary: 
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or 
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect.61 
Based on "the responsibility to protect" rather than "the right to intervene", it has 
come to be acknowledged, according to the Commission, "that it is only if the state is 
unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility [to protect], or is itself the perpetrator, 
that it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its place".62 
A "culture of reaction" must accordingly be converted in the mindset of the 
international community into a "culture of prevention".63 The Commission asserted the 
right to take military action in the event of unwillingness and inability on two fronts: 
self-defence and humanitarian intervention. The right to self-defence within the 
confines of article 51 of the UN Charter has thus been extended "to include the right 
to launch punitive raids into neighbouring countries that had shown themselves 
                                        
61  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para (1)B. 
62  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para 2.29. 
63  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para 3.42. 
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unwilling or unable to stop their territory being used as a launching pad for cross-
border armed attacks or terrorist attacks".64 
As far as humanitarian intervention is concerned, the Commission noted an "emerging 
principle" of international humanitarian law proclaiming "that intervention for human 
protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, is supportable 
when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state 
in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator".65 The 
Commission emphasized, though, that "[m]ilitary intervention for human protection 
purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and extraordinary measure, and for it 
to be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human 
beings, or immediately likely to occur".66 Military intervention for human protection 
purposes is in the opinion of the Commission justified in two "broad sets of 
circumstances" only, namely: 
… in order to halt or avert:  
 large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which 
is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or 
a failed state situation; or  
 large scale "ethnic cleansing," actual or apprehended, whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.67 
These conditions, according to the Commission, satisfy the "just cause" component of 
a decision to intervene.68 
It should be noted that humanitarian intervention in the traditional sense is aimed at 
toppling a repressive government responsible for severe violations of the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of its own people. The unwilling or unable rationale is not 
aimed at the toppling of a government but authorises military intervention by State A 
against terrorist groups in State B in cases where State B is unwilling or unable to 
repress the acts of terrorism committed or orchestrated within its borders. 
                                        
64  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para 2.10. 
65  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para 2.25. 
66  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para 4.18. 
67  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para 4.19. 
68  ICISS 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf para 4.19. 
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The barbaric acts executed by ISIS clearly come within the confines of these 
indisputable ignitions of a just cause. 
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